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This paper maintains that the nature of conventions and social 
contracts among the software developing community have been decisive 
in the open source software development. It will be explained that 
purposeful design has played a minor role in the overall success of open 
source projects, such as Linux operating system.  
In addition to conventions and social contracts, the paper will 
examine the importance of three other factors: (1) objective knowledge 
aspect of the shared source code, (2) modularity of software, and (3) 
selection of software by the project management. The conclusion will be 
that the extent to which these elements are of designed origin, their 
design is not ultimately critical to open source software development.  
The open source software model is based on the freedom to use, 
copy, modify and redistribute software. The term open source means that 
the source code needed to modify software is provided, and that the 
users/developers have the right not only to use, but also to modify and 
distribute modified versions. The starting point is that nobody is 
permitted to pronounce an exclusive property right to open source 
software. The proprietary model with which the open source model is 
convenient to be compared is based on a more conventional idea of 
copyright. The developer/distributor reserves all rights to copy, modify 
and distribute while users have only the right to use the software.  
The sketch of the complex and interdependent model is as 
follows. The elements of the model are examined in terms of their 
degree of intentional design vs. unintended impact, as well as in relation 
to their degree of importance or necessity to the process. The analysis 
will begin by looking at general conventions of fairness among the 
software-developing community. These conventions are unintended 
from the open source software development point of view. The 
conventions of fairness give rise to specific conventions of ‘property’ in 
open source development. Drawing upon these conventions, the central 
players in open source development designed a social contract to 
maintain the beneficial pattern of cooperation among developers.  
Open source software itself brings important elements to the 
model as well. Three elements are considered here: technological 
modularity which is viewed here as comprising both intentional and 
unintended elements, the objective knowledge aspect of source code as 
an enhancement to communication (an unintended element), and the 
selection process of software improvements which is an intended 
element in the model. All these elements together give rise to interests and 
capabilities of the members to participate in the development of open 
source software. Genuine uncertainty of the overall interplay between 
these elements was implied by Linus Torvalds, the founder of Linux, the 
prominent open source operating system: ‘Only afterwards have we 
started thinking about what went right in the process’ (Wow, 1 June 
2000), and ‘Linux emerged by coincidence’ (Wow, 28 Nov 2001).  
The paper is organised as follows. I begin by discussing the 
background of open source software development. The second 
following section will examine open source conventions and social 




enforcement. In the third section, I examine the modularity, objective 
knowledge and selection related aspects of open source development. 
The fourth section will examine the interplay among the spontaneous 
and the purposefully designed elements of the model. A central issue for 
the future of the open source paradigm appears to be the question about 
how the social contract will develop.  
 
Open source software – aims and rationales 
 
Open source software development is looked upon today with 
increasing astonishment. From the rational maximisation perspective, it 
should not exist or at least not spread as fast as it does. Acquiring, 
developing and distributing open software is free of charge. The 
developers do not receive the right to own their contribution and are 
required to provide access for anybody to obtain their contribution. 
Access to and distribution of software is facilitated by modern 
technology, especially by the Internet and e-mail news groups.  
The beginning of the open source movement, in the early 1980s, 
was a conscious attempt to continue the software-sharing conventions of 
the software developers’ community. Sharing and exchanging software 
freely among the developers was the convention before; in the early 
1980s prominent university laboratories and companies started using 
nondisclosure agreements to prevent the distribution of free copies 
(Stallman 1999). The software-sharing convention at that time was 
rational from the developer’s point of view, as income streams were not 
connected to choices whether or not to distribute copies and 
modifications. The game was reciprocal where everyone gained by 
helping and receiving help from others. But the game can go on only as 
long as copyrights and licenses do not prevent it — and they started to 
do precisely that.  
There were many reasonable reasons for the increasing use of 
copyright and restrictive licenses in the 1980s. Without going too deep 
into that line of discussion, one can hypothesise that the change from 
huge central computers toward personal computers was an important 
factor in the development. The rise of proprietary software made some 
members of the software developers’ community uncomfortable. The 
question was not so much about whether it was morally correct for 
somebody to make money out of developing and selling useful software. 
It was perhaps more about how they perceived software in general. They 
viewed software as a general means to help people – very much like 
language. Nobody would like to see our common language being closed 
up by someone who would then have the sole right to modify and 
distribute it.  
The open source movement arose as a countermovement to the 
proprietary model. In order to be able to resist the increasing 
dissemination of proprietary software, open source developers needed to 
create their own operating system, and the ‘GNU’ project was born 
(Stallman 1999). The GNU project was built upon a set of principles that 
can be viewed as the social contract of open source movement. The terms 
of this social contract, called Copyleft, were later on considered too 




business people, they need to alleviate/omit some terms to facilitate the 
combination of the open source and the proprietary models. This 
process appears to be increasingly in the core of open source software 
development today.  
A distinctive organisational aspect of open source software 
development is that there are no predefined boundaries to an open 
source software organisation. Membership in a project is based on self-
selection where those developers who feel capable of contribution do. 
An open source software project uses software development capabilities 
throughout the world. Suggested improvements and modifications are 
then reviewed by a central agency, the project management, which has 
the right to select between beneficial and less beneficial suggestions. The 
Internet functions as a prominent means of coordination and 
communication among developers.  
A central distinction between open source and proprietary 
approaches in software development is that the proprietary approach 
allows the developers to collect rent from the secret bits of their 
software, while on the other hand, it forecloses the possibility of truly 
independent peer review. The open source approach sets up conditions 
for independent peer review, but precludes the extraction of rent from 
the secret bits (Raymond 1999).  
A central issue that open source software developers need to 
tackle is the special structure of rights and responsibilities. The rejection 
of the conventional property rights structure complicates the 
accountability of each developer. As the social contract does not 
encourage demarcation of various rights among developers, conventions 
emerge to remedy the situation. Open source development benefited 
from building upon conventions that had been developed in software-
developers’ communities earlier. The open source conventions need not 
be discovered in the genuine sense because for those who shared the 
earlier cooperative behavioural pattern, they are rather obvious remedies 
to the problems that would predictably arise in their absence. Thus, the 
existence of multilateral reciprocity among software developers influence 
their procedural interests to continue cooperating even if the property 
rights in the software world were changing toward the proprietary 
model.  
 
Open source social contracts and conventions 
 
Open source software development is based on a peculiar pattern 
of rights and responsibilities. This section will analyse the terms of the 
open source social contract, which was intentionally designed to preserve 
open development, and the conventions that arose to frame this 
development. The social contract prevents anyone from pronouncing 
exclusive property rights to open source software, whereas central open 
source conventions function precisely to define particular property 
rights. There is an interesting interplay between the deliberate aim of the 
social contract and conventions that define boundaries between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.  
To complicate things, there is an additional set of principles, the 




provide more closure than the social contract, the Copyleft. A number of 
licenses have emerged based upon the OSD. The development of those 
licenses shows a tendency away from the original social contract towards 
a hybrid version of open source and proprietary principles.  
 
Copyleft and GPL — the original social contract 
 
The aim of the open source movement was to counterbalance the 
increasingly proprietary world of software development. In order to 
secure that open source software, after having left the hands of the 
original developer, remains open source, a legally binding set of rules 
needed to be established. The solution was found in the combination of 
copyrighting and licensing. Copyright resolved a problem that, e.g., 
public domain software suffered from. Public domain software is free in 
the extreme sense that anyone is free to take a copy of such software, 
pronounce it as her own, change the author (or any other) information, 
and start selling it under whatever license she wishes.  
The open source people were knowledgeable of the risks that 
complete freedom might bring about (such as converting open source 
development into closed source), so they chose to copyright their 
software, and to provide the General Public License (GPL, see 
references) based upon the principles of Copyleft to go with it. Copyleft 
uses copyright law but functions as the mirror image of the conventional 
use of copyright. The central idea of Copyleft is to give everyone 
permission to run a programme, to copy, redistribute, modify, and 
distribute modified versions — but not the permission to add 
restrictions to the license. It is important to notice that the freedom 
Copyleft provides does not have anything to do with price. Anyone is 
free to charge anything one wishes from (re)distribution — as long as 
the same opportunity is open to anyone else as well.  
The central aim of Copyleft being the prevention of open source 
software from becoming converted into closed source, some important, 
although unintended, implications follow. A central license design 
problem is that the designer must not only consider various activities a 
licensee is prevented from doing, but she must also imagine various ways 
a licensee could circumvent any of the license terms. The aim of the 
GPL license is not to prevent people from distributing GPLed software 
together with closed source software using the same medium (such as a 
CD-rom). To be sure, the open source principle would have nothing 
against combining open and closed source software into an aggregate 
programme, if it were possible to demarcate where one license starts and 
another ends. This is, however, technically next to impossible and would 
provide ample opportunities for the more restrictive license to 
encompass the less restrictive, the end result being that the whole 
programme would be interpreted through the more restrictive license.  
For this reason, GPL contains a term that permits distribution only 
as ‘independent and separate works’ with software based on a license 
more restrictive than the GPL. An attempt to combine GPLed software 
with another based on a more restrictive license is legitimate only if the 
resulting whole becomes GPLed. This is why GPL is considered viral or 
contagious. But we need to recognise the motivation behind this viral 




being interpreted through the more restrictive, in other words, it 
prevents GPLed software from being hijacked by closed source 
software. I will turn to this point below when the more relaxed Open 
Source Definition is discussed.  
 
Open Source Definition (OSD) - the revised social contract 
 
Open Source Definition (OSD, see references) is a bill of rights for 
the recipient of open source software. It functions as a certificate that 
ensures that licenses accepted by OSD meet the required criteria and can 
thus be defined as open source licenses (Perens 1999). OSD grew from a 
certain degree of discomfort with the demand of symmetry and 
reciprocity in Copyleft and GPL. The developers of OSD wanted to 
better be able to connect with the closed source world and still ensure 
that open source software remains open source. Here are the OSD terms 
and a short analysis on their function:  
 
1. Free redistribution: a license based on OSD may not restrict 
any party from selling or giving away the software as a 
component of an aggregate software distribution 
containing programmes from several different sources. 
The license may not require a royalty or other fee for such 
a sale. The rationale behind this clause is to promote free 
redistribution by eliminating incentives for extracting 
rents on others’ work. This clause has the effect of 
retaining the game cooperative. 
2. The source code must be included. This clause enhances the 
development of open source software as modifications 
are often impossible without having access to the source 
code.  
3. Derived works: a license must allow modifications and 
derived works to the original software, and must allow 
them to be distributed under the same terms as the license 
of the original software. For rapid development of 
software, people need to be able to experiment with and 
redistribute modifications. This clause has an interesting 
implication, as it does not require any producer of a 
derived work to use the same license terms as the original, 
it only provides an option to do so.  
4. Integrity of the author’s source code: a license must explicitly 
permit distribution of software built from modified 
source code and it may require derived works to carry a 
different name or version number from the original 
software. This clause enhances reputation building among 
developers. People need to know who is responsible for 
particular modifications. The term also facilitates the 
distinction between official and unofficial changes to 
software.  
5. No discrimination against persons or groups. This clause is based 
on the recognition of the Hayekian problem of dispersed 
knowledge. Promoting diversity of people and groups 




we do not know beforehand who will discover something 
valuable.  
6. No discrimination against fields of endeavour: for example, a 
license may not restrict software from being used in a 
business. This clause encourages commercial use of open 
source software.  
7. Distribution of license: rights attached to a programme must 
apply to all to whom the programme is redistributed 
without the need for execution of an additional license by 
those parties. This clause prevents any attempt to 
indirectly close up software, such as requiring a non-
disclosure agreement.   
8. The license must not be specific to a product: rights attached to a 
programme must not depend on the programme’s being 
part of a particular software distribution. This clause 
facilitates extracting open source software from any 
distribution, and preserving the extracted software with 
the same rights as those that are granted in conjunction 
with the original software distribution.  
9. The license must not contaminate other software: a license must 
not place restrictions on other software that is distributed 
along with the licensed software. This clause facilitates the 
distribution of open source software along with proprietary 
software, but at the same time it restricts combining open 
source software with proprietary software under the 
license of the latter. So, any combined work needs to be 
distributed under OSD.  
 
The third clause on derivative works contradicts the terms of 
Copyleft and the GPL insofar as more restrictive terms can be 
introduced to the modification. What this clause does is that it opens up 
the possibility to privatise modifications and charge money from their 
use. The OSD conformant BSD license (see references) provides 
precisely this. However, OSD restricts charging money from the initial 
license only, so the holder of the initial license is restricted from charging 
anything from the subsequent redistributions. This creates a tendency for 
the price of BSD licensed software to approach zero, but it also permits 
converting a derivative work on BSD software into closed source.  
The critical point in preserving open source development open 
also in the future appears to be the modifiability of license terms. The 
GPL license terms themselves are outside the rights that the license 
provides, that is, the GPL defines rights to software which does not 
include the license itself. By this it prevents any attempt to modify the 
license terms and can thus guarantee that software which is initially 
distributed under GPL also remains under it, irrespective of how much it 
will be modified during the development. The modifiability of the BSD 
license terms does not provide any guarantee of the future development 








Open source conventions 
 
Open source conventions are based on fairness, non-
discrimination and equal treatment of all parties. While most open 
source developers do not object to others profiting from their 
contribution, most also demand that no party be in an exclusive position 
to extract profits. A developer is willing to let someone else to profit by 
selling her software or patches, but only as long as the developer herself 
could also potentially do so (consistent with both Copyleft and OSD). 
Developers have observed that licenses that include restrictions on 
and fees for commercial use have serious chilling effects. Restrictions on 
use, sale, modification, or distribution inflict cost of conformance 
tracking and, as the number of packages people deal with rises, 
uncertainty and potential legal risk increases. This outcome is considered 
harmful, and there is therefore social pressure to keep licenses simple 
and free of restrictions. Despite this convention, new variants of more 
restrictive licenses have been developed (such as the BSD). A potential 
source for this development are aspirations to benefit from the available 
open source software together with the positive value of the open source 
label, and at the same time to gain a monopoly position through 
exclusive rights to software.  
A central function of open source conventions has to do with 
preserving the peer-review culture based on multilateral reciprocity. 
License restrictions designed to protect intellectual property or capture 
direct sale value often have the effect of making it legally impossible to 
fork1 the project. While forking is considered a last resort, it is 
considered critically important that that last resort be present as 
protection against a maintainer’s incompetence or defection (Raymond 
1999).  
The open source social contracts (both the Copyleft and the OSD) 
permit that anyone can hack anything. Nothing prevents half a dozen 
different people from taking any given open source product, duplicating 
the sources, running off with them in different evolutionary directions, 
all claiming to be ‘The’ product. In practice, however, such forking 
almost never happens. Splits in major projects have been rare, and 
always accompanied by re-labelling and a large volume of public self-
justification. The open source movement has an elaborate but largely 
spontaneous set of ownership conventions. These conventions regulate 
who can modify software, the circumstances under which it can be 
modified, and who has the right to redistribute modified versions back 
to the community (Raymond 1998):  
 
• There is strong social pressure against forking projects. 
Forking does not happen except under special conditions, 
with much public self-justification, and with a renaming.  
• Distributing changes to a project without the cooperation 
of the moderators is disapproved.  
                                                 
1 Forking means to take any given open source product, to duplicate the 




• Removing a developer's name from a project history, 
credits or maintainer list is not permitted without the 
person's explicit consent.  
 
What does ‘ownership’ mean when property is infinitely 
reduplicable, highly malleable, and there are no explicit coercive power 
relationships in the surrounding culture? The owner(s) of an open source 
software project are those who have the exclusive right, recognised by 
the community at large, to redistribute modified versions. According to 
the standard open source licenses, all parties are equals in the 
evolutionary game. But in practice there is a well-recognised distinction 
between ‘official’ patches, approved and integrated into the evolving 
software by the publicly recognised maintainers, and ‘rogue’ patches by 
third parties. Rogue patches are unusual, and generally not trusted 
(Raymond 1998).  
Conventions encourage people to modify software for personal 
use when necessary. Conventions are also rather indifferent to activities 
of redistributing modified versions within a closed user or development 
group. It is only when modifications are posted to the open source 
community in general, to compete with the original, that ownership 
becomes an issue. 
There are, in general, three ways to acquire ownership of an open 
source project. One is to set up a project. When a project has only had 
one maintainer since the beginning and the maintainer is still active, 
convention does not even permit a question as to who owns the project. 
The second way is to have ownership of a project to be transferred by 
the previous owner. There is a clear convention that project owners have 
a duty to pass projects on to competent successors when they are no 
longer willing or able to invest needed time in development or 
maintenance work. The third way to acquire ownership of a project is to 
observe that it needs work and the owner has disappeared or lost 
interest. The responsibility of the acquirer is to make an effort to find the 
previous owner. If the previous owner cannot be found, then the 
acquirer may announce in a relevant place (such as a Usenet newsgroup 
dedicated to the application area) that the project appears to be 
orphaned, and that she is considering taking responsibility for it. 
Convention demands that the acquirer allow some time to pass after the 
announcement. In this interval, if someone else announces that they 
have been actually working on the project, their claim exceeds the 
newcomers. It is considered good form to give public notice of the 
intentions more than once.  
These features suggest that the conventions are not accidental, 
although they may be spontaneous responses to the social contracts that 
do not clearly define property rights among the developers; spontaneous 
in the sense that such conventions are increasingly conformed to within 
a group facing such a social contract. Later on in this paper the open 
source conventions are examined against the background of an ancient 







Objective knowledge, modularity, and selection 
 
In this section, three further components of the model are 
introduced: (1) objective knowledge, (2) technological modularity, and 
(3) project management in open source software development. The 
central aspect in the communication structure considered here is 
unintended, it has to do with the nature of software per se. The 
technological modularity demonstrates both intentional and unintended 
aspects of open source development, and the same goes for project 
management.   
 
Communication and objective knowledge 
 
At first glance, concepts like informal networks or communities of 
practice seem to illustrate well what is going on in open source software 
organisations. A well functioning organisation needs appropriate means 
for communication and knowledge sharing among its members. 
Whenever informal networks appear, they tend to generate their own 
norms and conventions to facilitate communication, thus constituting 
communities of practice (Crane 1972, Lave and Wenger 1991). This 
happens both within and across organisations.  
The development of structure in a community of practice depends 
on the overall size of the community and on the diversity of skills 
available. Collaborative performance enhancement depends not only on 
these two factors but also on the rates at which the members produce 
results that are beneficial for the whole community (Huberman and 
Hogg 1995, 74). Huberman and Hogg advocate an idea of a natural limit, 
or bandwidth, to the number of people an individual member can 
interact with in a network. This limit ranges from types of situations 
where the members can interact with everybody very rarely to types 
where a limited number of members interact very often.  
Open source software projects can be analysed, however, through 
an alternative model of communication, which is less limited by the 
natural bandwidth effect. It differs from the basic network model in that 
the members need not interact directly with each other. There is a 
component that facilitates the flow of knowledge beyond what the 
members could attain when interacting directly with each other. This 
component is the objective knowledge inherent in the software itself (cf. 
Popper 1972). What makes knowledge within an open source project so 
unique is the source code that is always provided together with the binary 
version.  
Consider two software developers who try to communicate some 
functionality problems in a closed source programme, say Microsoft 
Word. Neither of them has the access to the source code as they do not 
work for Microsoft. When they discuss the problem they need to 
continuously interpret and reinterpret what the other party is saying and 
meaning because they lack an exact language that would require little or 
no interpretation. The source code provides precisely that function in 
two distinguishable ways: (1) by being an exact language, and (2) by being 
objective knowledge by which developers can coordinate (through trial and 




body of objective knowledge, but here language is discussed as the 
meaning of a means of communication, separate from the knowledge 
content of any particular sentence. This distinction can be found in, e.g., 
computer languages that can function simultaneously as a shared 
language among software developers (coordinator of meanings) and as 
carrying out objectively existing functions (a piece of code has an effect 
in software disregarding how it is interpreted).  
To see the difference between the network model of 
communication and the one suggested here consider the following figure 
1: 
 
Figure 1: Communication models 
All-channel interaction Communication through object  
 
Here we have two communication models among five members. 
In the first model, the members communicate directly with each other 
while in the second model an object (such as software) functions as an 
objective entity to which each member relates. A core difference 
between these models is that in the first alternative the members need to 
find out who knows what at each instance, whereas in the second model 
the objective entity coordinates the type of knowledge that is needed at 
each instance. In the first model, communication among the members is 
limited by their abilities (including the costs) of maintaining versatile 
connections (the bandwidth) whereas in the second model, only those 
members who at a particular instance perceive being able to add value to 
the development process do so. Open source software is rather an 
extreme case as it functions as an exact language and as objective 
knowledge at the same time.  
Cusumano (1997, 9) suggests that small teams conducting complex 
tasks are more effective than large ones because it is easier to have good 
communication and consistency of ideas among team members. Two 
issues are of interest here. First, the question of what is meant by good 
communication and consistency of ideas. Second, the issue of knowing 
in advance who will know something valuable in the future.  
Good communication is assumed here to be directed at a target 
(such as software which Cusumano’s article deals with). Good 
communication may mean that things that are understandable by the 
majority or all members are communicated. Frictions in communication 
may be due to some members being smarter than the rest, or less smart 
(among many other reasons). Consistency of ideas is linked with good 
communication. What the members perceive as good communication 




clear to what extent consistency of ideas works well as a primary 
criterion when complex systems are being developed. A novel idea may 
be in conflict with the established pattern of consistency, and thus 
become rejected before it is assessed to its full potential. A small team 
may work well in resolving conflicting interests among the group members, 
but the smaller the group the less versatile ideas it can produce.  
This links us to the Hayekian knowledge problem, i.e., to our 
ignorance of who may be in the best position in the future to resolve 
particular problems. If the group members are defined from the 
beginning, then only those discoveries can be made that are perceived by 
the members. If then consistency works as the moderator of ideas, only 
those discoveries are recognised that are consistent with the patterns that 
are already established. Discoveries become thus limited in two steps: 




Cusumano (1997) describes how Microsoft makes large teams 
work like small teams. The core strategy is to break both the organisation 
and the products into subunits to facilitate coordination among the 
members and product components. The keyword is modularisation, both 
at the organisational and the product levels.  
Modularity refers to a general set of principles for managing 
complexity. Modularity is attained by breaking up a complex system into 
discrete subunits which can communicate with each other only through 
standardised interfaces within standardised architecture (Langlois 2000, 
1). By doing so a development team can prevent the design process from 
becoming excessively complex at many levels at the same time. The 
keyword in modularisation is thus standardisation of the critical interfaces 
that subunits interact with. The degree of modularity in a system can be 
assessed by examining to what extent small changes in one part of a 
system lead to unpredictable outcomes in other parts of the system. If a 
system is decomposed into modules, then changes in one module do not 
affect others. What modularity does is it breaks the interdependency 
among the subunits as each module interacts solely with the common 
interface.  
Modularity within organisations can be divided into different 
types: modularity of the organisation itself, modularity of the products, 
and finally, modularity of property rights within the organisation. 
Langlois (2000) suggests, contrary to Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), that 
technological modularity does not necessarily presuppose organisational 
modularity. Indeed, there seems to be no compelling reason to assume 
that product modularity necessarily leads to organisational modularity.  
Cusumano (1997) describes how Microsoft applies both 
organisational and technological modularity to coordinate and stabilise 
software development. Open source software, like Linux-derived 
operating systems, demonstrate a high degree of technological 
modularity but a lower degree of organisational modularity. According to 
Cusumano (1997) in large development projects in Microsoft, ‘many 
team members create many components or features that are 
interdependent but difficult to define accurately in the early stages of the 




‘synchronize what people are doing as individuals and as members of 
teams working in parallel on different features, and periodically stabilize 
the evolving product features in increments as a project proceeds’ (p. 
11). The strategy is to continuously iterate among several designs, builds, 
and testing while developing a product (ibid.). All this seems to indicate 
that, contrary to Cusumano’s view on modularisation in Microsoft, their 
product development is in fact non-modular. Modularity would prevent 
interdependency problems and activities resulting from these: 
continuous synchronisation and iteration as projects evolve.  
The object oriented model of communication shown above 
illustrates open source software development. Consider the object being 
decomposed into modules each interacting with a standardised interface. 
In open source software development, the team responsible for 
developing a particular feature is not defined in the beginning of the 
project. Instead, the team itself evolves according to the capabilities of 
individual members to resolve particular problems that arise during the 
development. Communication among developers is facilitated through 
interfaces and is carried out in specific arenas (e.g., discussion groups on 
the Internet) for communicating particular issues. The organisation itself 
is non-modular in the sense that there is no team exclusively defined to 
various development projects. If a developer identifies the ability to 
contribute to a project at a specific instance, she can freely do so. A 
central benefit from not limiting the development team is that more 
discoveries and innovations arise during the development process. 
Another beneficial aspect of keeping the development team open is that 
we do not know in advance which developer might resolve a problem 
arising from the previous round of improvements. The development of 
open source software show a dramatically higher speed of improvements 
and debugging than what is achieved within the closed source 
development (e.g., stability and speed of development of Linux vs. 




Open source software organisations are open, non-hierarchical 
systems. Project management can be distinguished from other members, 
however. The management normally consists of the property rights 
owners (defined by convention). The development of the open source 
operating system Linux has involved a myriad of extensions and 
improvements along the years, and yet its initial developer, Linus 
Torvalds, holds the position to unilaterally select among potential 
improvements. This suggests two unrelated issues: first, the strength of 
the property right conventions in open source development, and second, 
a conjecture about the respective importance of variation and selection 
in software development.  
As time passes, the weight of other developers’ contributions to 
any given project normally increases. As in the case of Linux, the initial 
developer may limit his tasks to almost solely selecting incoming 
suggestions. The principle of prominence may play a central role in 
sustaining the property rights convention. As years pass and thousands 




only prominent person who stands out is the one who has held the right 
to select among trials.  
This leads us to an interesting suggestion: prominence does not 
necessarily arise from the critical nature of the task, but perhaps from a 
simpler fact that the person who selects stands out because of her role as 
the initiator. The chain of thought goes something like this: empirical 
findings show that open source software demonstrates specific strengths 
over closed source alternatives. These have to do with the speed of 
improvement and bug fixing, reliability and stability, among other things. 
This being a general pattern it is hardly likely that open source project 
managers just happen to be superior in selecting good suggestions from 
bad ones. Rather, a potential explanation would be that selection is not 
the central problem, whereas creating variation is. An experienced 
developer can perhaps easily see what suggestions are worth looking 
into. And then, technological modularity enhances testing and assessing 
new variants. Creating variation is precisely what open source software 
development is superior in. The number of suggestions (variation) to any 
open source project of some interest exceeds what a coherent closed 
source development team could ever come up with.  
This links us back to the nature of prominence in the open source 
property right convention. Insofar as selection is not the critical issue, 
but the creation of variation is, important contributions should have 
some role in the property right structure. The result would be that open 
source software would be ‘owned’ by many, instead of by few. This 
would, however, be dysfunctional from the project management point of 
view. Consider suggestions for improvements being voted on in 
discussion groups. The dysfunctionality of voting assumes of course that 
software developed by voting would not be any better than another 
developed by the single selector model. The fact that voting is not 
generally used promotes the argument that selecting is not the central 
problem.  
This section has suggested three central features to the open 
source software model: (1) acknowledgement of the dispersed nature of 
knowledge and of the problem of stimulating the growth of knowledge, 
(2) communication through an objective entity that functions as a 
communication interface among the members, and (3) technological 
modularity of the software.  
 
Dynamics of the interplay 
 
As explained earlier in this paper, open source social contracts 
(Copyleft and OSD) and conventions work in opposite directions. The 
social contracts facilitate open development by preventing exclusive 
property rights while conventions define property rights among the 
members. It is, however, important to notice that social contracts and 
conventions have a common origin, namely conventions. A social 
contract, while being a product of intentional deliberation, depends on 
conventions of fairness and just conduct. The connection becomes 
effective as soon as we introduce the possibility of social contract, not 
only to constrain behaviour, but also to modify interests. After reaching 




self-interest from arising, the members may be better able to observe the 
benefits of long-term consequences. Their consequential interests toward 
reciprocal behaviour may increase as they learn during the game. The 
game becomes developmental as experience together with expectations 
facilitates steps to a higher level of cooperation.  
 
Conventions and interpretation 
 
The development of conventions is linked with precedents and 
prominence (Schelling 1960, Lewis 1969). Interpreting the behavioural 
recommendations of conventions in specific situations may create 
problems even if the individual is procedurally motivated in finding the 
appropriate solution. The hierarchical structure of conventions does not 
necessarily help the task of interpretation. The individual may search for 
analogous conventions applied in situations somehow resembling the 
one at hand, or she may resort to a more general convention that applies 
through a number of dissimilar situations. For instance, a general 
convention of ‘finders — keepers’ that provides a moral argument for 
first possession is clear as a principle, but less so in empirical terms. 
Depending on a more precise convention of proper behaviour when 
finding money on the pavement, the finder may either consider herself 
the first possessor or not.  
Consider open source property rights conventions against the 
finders — keepers convention. It seems morally plausible to argue that 
an individual obtains the property right to an unowned resource by 
mixing her mental and physical labour with it (Locke 1986, Hume 1969, 
Rothbard 1982, 33). According to this Lockean idea, nobody is in the 
position to simply pronounce legal ownership to a vast area of land 
without indicating a differential relation to it by, e.g., fencing and 
cultivating it. Analogously, one who is the first to pick up driftwood on 
an unowned shore has the right to claim the ownership title to the 
findings because no other principle offers more prominent justification 
(Sugden 1986, 95). The Western tradition of property rights is largely 
consistent with this principle.  
The initiator of an open source software project is clearly the 
prominent candidate to claim ownership title to the project. The 
potential acquirer of an orphaned project needs to signal loudly her 
intentions, in order to make sure that the finders — keepers principle is 
applicable. In the same vein, forking is intuitively morally wrong because 
it violates the finders — keepers principle.  
Open source development demonstrates something that seems to 
violate the finders-keepers principle, however. After a project has been 
developing for a period of time, it may turn out that someone outside 
the project management has put mental and physical labour into the 
project to a degree that might contest the right of the initial owner. The 
finders — keepers principle does not necessarily provide a clear-cut 
solution because, on the one hand, the initial owner has a strong 
entitlement, but on the other hand, new extensions and modifications 
can be viewed as new, hitherto unowned elements whose moral 
entitlement should go to the developer.  
Examining open source conventions on ownership against the 




inherent tendency of open source development to dissolve. The 
realisticness of this conjecture depends on the relative strengths of 
finders — keepers and open source property right conventions. The 
inherent morale in finders — keepers deals with balancing effort with 
entitlement. The more effort one puts into an unowned resource, the 
more justified a property right claim is. The open source convention of 
retaining the property right with the project initiator may contradict our 
interpretation of justice when contributions and efforts flow from the 
group at large. If this is so, our interpretation of finders-keepers is closer 
to what I suggested above, that the creation of a modification or 
extension is perceived per se as justified basis for ownership.  
Later developments in open source software suggest a tendency 
toward disintegration and toward the proprietary model. Instead of 
putting efforts to the development of one Linux operating system, the 
community has offered dozens of commercial Linux versions. Their 
prices have risen to almost the same level as Microsoft Windows, their 
major closed-source rival.  
 
Objective knowledge, modularity and project management 
 
The objective knowledge aspect of open source software is clearly 
an unintended element. That source code functions as a coordinative 
language and as a functioning object at the same time, enhancing 
communication even though these functions have not been deliberately 
designed from the communication point of view.  
Technological modularity demonstrates both potentially 
intentional and unintended elements. When Linus Torvalds in the early 
1990s started developing the Linux kernel, he probably did not have 
technological modularity as one of his prime goals. Technological 
modularity may often be the result of purposeful deliberation, but it may 
also grow more organically during development. Irrespective of the 
degree of intent, technological modularity enhances communication as 
developers do not have to control the whole system at once. They can 
focus their communication to a limited set of features they want to 
develop. Another communication-aiding aspect of technological 
modularity is the coordinative function of shared interfaces. They delimit 
ways of communication and reduce the demand for versatile exchange of 
ideas. When all parties share an interpretation of the central aspects of an 
interface, they do not have to test the extent to which other parties share 
this knowledge (disregarding the fact that discrepancies in their 
interpretations may occur).  
The unilateral right of the project initiator to function as the sole 
selector seems intriguing as it does not necessarily convey the 
conventionally desirable picture of functional efficiency. If the 
conjecture of this paper holds that selection is not the central issue in 
open source software development, since what matters most is the 
continuous inflow of variations and discoveries, then the connection 
between being the initiator of a project and receiving the property right 
to the whole project through convention appears potentially unjustified 








This paper has suggested that in open source software 
development conventions play an important role in defining property 
rights. Social contracts perform an equally important function in 
preventing conflicting interests from destroying the cooperative mode of 
interaction. The open source software itself brings elements of objective 
knowledge and technological modularisation that enhance 
communication and coordination. All these elements together reduce the 
need for managerial control regarding both coordination of knowledge 
and provision of incentives.  
In this model, intentional elements do not seem to receive any 
apparent priority. It is recognised, however, that the design of the initial 
social contract plays a central role in facilitating open development. 
Without its restrictions to non-reciprocal behaviour, open source 
software would hardly have developed to what it is today. On the other 
hand, it is equally important to recognise the source of social contract. 
The designers did not genuinely discover the purpose of the Copyleft, 
instead, they codified something that was already there in the form of 
earlier conventions of the software developers’ community. By setting up 
the Copyleft terms they wanted to continue what they perceived as 
beneficial development which was under attack by the introduction of 
the proprietary model.  
The dependency of social contract upon convention becomes 
apparent in the establishing process of a social contract. The Copyleft 
would have been impossible to establish as a social contract unless the 
members perceived its terms as fair and beneficial to development. 
Although social contract is conceptually a product of intentional design, 
its content is so strongly based on spontaneous development of 
conventions that it becomes difficult to distinguish what parts of its 
content are not already established by surrounding conventions.  
A central question concerning the future of open source 
development is: which one becomes the prevailing social contract, 
Copyleft or OSD? If Copyleft wins out, then open source development 
has better chances to remain genuinely open, at the cost of foregone 
profits from the proprietary model. If the OSD/BSD becomes the social 
contract, it may enhance the destruction of open source development 
because the BSD license does not prohibit changes in the license itself, 
even though the consequence might be the transformation from open to 
closed source.  
The option to take open source private and make profit has several 
consequences. (1) The existence of the option per se changes incentive 
structures as the members understand the dynamics of prisoners’ 
dilemmas. 2) Opportunities for defection lead to changes in expectation 
about how other members will behave in the future. (3) The changed 
expectations reinforce incentives to defect. An important aspect in this 
process of incentive change is that the triggering element does not have 
to be a real event. The fact that an option exists may be enough to bring 
reluctance toward contributing to development that is vulnerable to 




reference point consideration. If Copyleft did not exist as the initial 
social contract, the members would not perceive OSD/BSD as a 
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